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1INTRODUCTION
At approximately 10 o’clock on the morning of February 19, 1942, the 
Imperial Japanese Navy and Army Air Force opened a coordinated attack 
on Darwin, Australia. More than 188 aircraft launched from four air-
craft carriers and fifty-five land-based bombers destroyed shipping and 
the harbor’s transport and military infrastructure. Nearly an hour later, a 
subsequent raid by Japanese army bombers attacked the Royal Australian 
Air Force base at Parap, destroying numerous aircraft and base facilities. 
From February 1942 through November 1943, the Japanese conducted 
sixty-four more air attacks on Darwin. In addition, the Japanese carried 
out similar strikes on Townsville, Katherine, Windham, Derby, Broome, 
and Port Hedland. Even though Australia and New Zealand joined the 
war in 1939, their respective air forces were ill prepared at the outbreak 
of war with Japan because the majority of their military assets had been 
sent to the Middle East in support of British operations.
The study of the development of the air defense of Great Britain’s 
Pacific Dominions demonstrates the difficulty of applying the emerg-
ing military aviation technology to the defense of the global British 
Empire during the interwar years. It also provides insight into the 
changing nature of the political relationship between the Dominions 
and Britain within the British imperial structure. At the end of World 
War I, both Australia and New Zealand secured independent control 
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of their respective armed forces through their sacrifices made on the 
battlefields in the Middle East and Western Front and declining con-
fidence in British military leadership. Similar to the other nations that 
participated in the war, the population of these two Dominions in the 
1920s developed a strong aversion to war, not wishing to repeat the 
sacrifices made by their soldiers, sailors, and airmen on someone else’s 
behalf. The economic dislocation experienced by the Dominions, cre-
ated by the war and the Depression, meant little money was available 
to fund their respective air forces. 1 As a result, the empire’s air services 
spent the entire interwar period attempting to create a comprehensive 
strategy in the face of these handicaps. 
For many aviation advocates during the interwar period, the airplane 
represented a panacea to the imperial defense needs. They always prefaced 
their arguments with the word “potential.” The airplane could poten-
tially replace the navy; it could potentially provide substantial savings 
in defense expenditure; it could potentially move rapidly to threatened 
regions; and it could potentially defend the coast from attack or invasion. 
For all of these claims, there was no supporting empirical data. In short, 
aviation advocates offered the air force as a third option for the empire’s 
defense, in an attempt to replace the Royal Navy and British Army.
At first glance, it is easy to accuse Britain and its Dominions of 
willful neglect of their armed forces during the interwar years. As early 
as 1934, however, Britain’s military and political leadership understood 
the threat to peace and stability that Germany, Italy, and Japan repre-
sented, but the empire faced a difficult strategic problem in having a 
military force structure inadequate to defend the vast worldwide impe-
rial possessions and the inability to pay for the needed expansion. The 
General Staff, to the best of their ability, began to implement the neces-
sary steps required to expand their military forces to meet these threats 
and particularly directed funds to expand their respective air forces. 
Although the leadership was much criticized in the postwar period, 
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their diligence paid dividends as early as 1940, when Britain’s aircraft 
industry outpaced German aircraft production, and by 1944, the air 
forces of the British Empire experienced an expansion well beyond the 
perceived needs contemplated by the military and political leadership 
during the interwar period. Many of the policies adopted and imple-
mented by the RAF, RAAF, and RNZAF during the interwar years 
made this expansion possible.
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) experienced a fourfold 
increase from seventeen operational squadrons in 1939 to seventy-one 
in 1944. This included operational squadrons in Britain comprised of 
four heavy bomber, three medium/attack bomber, seven fighter, and 
one flying boat squadrons; in the Middle East there were two medium/
attack bomber and two fighter squadrons; and in the Pacific the RAAF 
fielded a force of fifty-five squadrons that included fourteen fighter, 
fifteen attack/medium bomber, eleven transport and liaison, eight sea-
plane, and seven heavy bomber squadrons. 2 In addition, more than 
4,000 Australian pilots, air crew members, and mechanics served in 
Royal Air Force (RAF) units throughout the war.
Likewise, the smaller Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) 
sustained a similar expansion from four prewar squadrons to thirty-
three squadrons by 1944. By the end of the war, New Zealand had 
based eight squadrons overseas, including seven in Britain, consisting 
of two fighter, three attack/medium bomber, one heavy bomber, and 
one flying boat squadrons, as well as one fighter squadron stationed 
in West Africa. Twenty-six RNZAF squadrons served in the Pacific 
theater and included thirteen fighter, six attack/medium bomber, two 
flying boat, two torpedo, two liaison/transport, and one dive-bomber 
squadrons that complemented American Army Air Forces, marine, 
and navy units throughout the entire Solomon Islands campaign. 3 In 
addition, New Zealand provided more than 10,363 trained personnel 
for service in the Royal Air Force. 4
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The raids on Darwin and the dramatic expansion of the Pacific 
Dominions’ air forces reflect the strategic decisions made during the 
interwar period concerning those nations’ aerial defense. With the 
advantage of hindsight, the Japanese air attacks on Australia confirmed 
the judgment of the British chiefs of the Imperial General Staff that 
the greatest threat to the continent would be raids and that Japan’s air 
power was incapable of a knockout blow. In addition, the chiefs’ views 
were confirmed when the Japanese decided not to invade Australia in 
early 1942.5
By the beginning of the World War II, there were essentially two 
Australian and New Zealand air forces that emerged from the inter-
war period. One consisted of the units and personnel that served in 
Britain as part of the Royal Air Force and that fulfilled the Dominions’ 
imperial commitments and prewar strategic assumptions. These units 
were trained, equipped, patterned after, and served alongside other 
RAF units. These Australian and New Zealand air force units repre-
sented the most significant contribution of men and materiel by the two 
Dominions in Western Europe during the war. Following the North 
African campaign, no Australian ground unit fought in Europe and 
only one New Zealand division served in the Italian campaign. 
Australia and New Zealand’s second air force were those RAAF 
and RNZAF units serving in the Pacific. These units represented the 
majority of the Dominions’ air power and the changing nature of their 
relationship with Britain. Both nations developed and kept a high per-
centage of their units in the Pacific for self-defense rather than providing 
them for the greater “imperial” need. Moreover, the makeup of these 
units totally disregarded the prewar assumption of imperial unifor-
mity. The RAAF units were an eclectic mix of British, Australian-built 
British and American designs, and American aircraft. In the case of 
New Zealand by the end of the war, all of its twenty-six squadrons 
were equipped exclusively with American aircraft. The rapid expansion 
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of both air forces would not have been possible without the aircraft 
provided by the United States. The war underscored the Dominions’ 
transition from the British to the American sphere of influence.
During the interwar period the Royal Air Force had to fight to 
maintain its independence. Likewise, the RAAF and RNZAF, because 
of political, economic, and technological circumstances, were largely 
“paper” air forces. In their effort to maintain their very existence, these 
imperial air forces presented themselves as a viable and economical 
third option in the defense of Britain’s global empire.
The inspiration of this work comes out of my interest in the Royal 
Navy during the interwar period. The terrible loss of HMS Prince of Wales 
and Repulse to waves of Japanese torpedo bombers on December 10, 
1941, and the surrender of 84,000 British and Commonwealth troops 
brought on many books about the failed “Fleet to Singapore” strat-
egy conceived by Fleet Admiral John Jellicoe in 1919. The plan called 
for the construction of a major naval facility located at Singapore to 
service and house the bulk of the Royal Navy if a crisis developed in 
the Pacific against the Japanese. Ian McGibbon’s Bluewater Rationale 
and Ian Hamill’s The Strategic Illusion, major works, both illustrate the 
importance of Singapore serving as a defensive hub to protect Britain’s 
eastern empire, particularly Australia and New Zealand. The Royal 
Air Force, equipped with inadequate aircraft that were few in number, 
tended to receive less treatment by historians. This changed in recent 
times with the publication of Christopher Shores and Brian Cull’s thor-
ough volume, Bloody Shambles: The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore, 
and Graham Clayton’s more focused study, Last Stand in Singapore: The 
Story of 488 Squadron RNZAF. One aspect of historical research on 
the RAF in the fall of Singapore points blame for the collapse at Air 
Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East. 
Appointed to the position in October 1941, he was on the job for less 
than four months before war broke out in the Pacific. Brooke-Popham’s 
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role is only recently receiving a reevaluation in Peter Dye’s The Man Who 
Took the Rap: Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and the Fall of Singapore. After 
reading these studies and others, I began to wonder if the RAF was 
making similar efforts concerning the defense of the Pacific empire. The 
answer was yes in an almost forgotten survey by Group Captain Arthur 
Bettington. Like Jellicoe, Bettington toured the Pacific Dominions in 
the immediate post–World War I period and made recommendations 
concerning the future of aerial defenses of the Dominions. So I became 
more interested in the Royal Air Force during the interwar period and 
wanted to trace its defense planning for the empire.
The vast majority of works on the RAF of the interwar period 
tend to emphasize British strategic bombing doctrine as conceived 
by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard. They trace a direct path to the 
massive formations of Halifax and Lancaster heavy bombers that 
laid waste to German cities. Four of the earliest works are Hilary St. 
George Saunders’s Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power, 1911–1939; 
H. Montgomery Hyde’s British Air Policy between the Wars, 1919–1939;
Neville Jones’s The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the
British Bomber Force, 1923–1939; and Barry Powers’s Strategy without
Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914–1939. In more recent times are
Malcom Smith’s British Air Strategy between the Wars, 1919–1939 and
Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution
of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945. All of
these histories focus on the role that the RAF would play in European
air space and do not address the position the RAF was attempting to
forge in imperial defense. If strategic bombing was a keystone to RAF
planning during the interwar period, why did Bomber Command have
such horrible aircraft at the beginning of World War II? The bomber
force would not see its first four-engine heavy bomber in the Short
Stirling until the summer of 1940 at the height of the Battle of Britain.
During the interwar period the RAF attempted to establish itself as a
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coequal in imperial defense beside the Royal Navy and British Army. 
Yes, Trenchard wrote about the need for a strategic bombing force, 
a duty in war unique to the RAF and a way to justify its continued 
independence. Trenchard was also a political realist and looked for any 
activity during the interwar period to keep the force autonomous from 
the army and navy. This has brought a number of interesting studies that 
examine the use of the RAF in the role of colonial control and policing. 
The most noted of these works include David Omissi’s Airpower and 
Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919–1939 and Barry Renfrew’s 
Wings of Empire: The Forgotten Wars of the Royal Air Force, 1919–1939.
To discover how air power developed in the Pacific, one must turn 
to historians from Australia and New Zealand for the answer. The open-
ing chapters of the two official histories of the RAAF and RNZAF in 
World War II in Douglas Gillison’s Australia in the War of 1939–1945, 
Series 3, Air, vol. I, Royal Australian Air Force, 1939–1942 and Sqd. 
Ldr. J. M. S. Ross’s New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945: 
The Royal New Zealand outline the activities of the origins, found-
ing, and interwar activities of their respective Dominion’s air forces. 
C. D. Coulthard-Clark’s The Third Brother: The Royal Australian Air
Force 1921–1939 is an excellent and comprehensive study of the RAAF
between the wars. John McCarthy’s Australia and Imperial Defense:
A Study in Air and Sea Power, 1918–1939 and W. David McIntyre’s New
Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy, 1919–39 are both wide-ranging
examinations of the defense policies of Australia and New Zealand and
both demonstrate the importance of these forces in the defense of their
region of the Pacific.
Now that a full century has passed since the end of World War I, 
this work, British Imperial Air Power: The Royal Air Forces and the Defense 
of Australia and New Zealand Between the World Wars, hopes to provide a 
fresh and comprehensive examination of the role that air power would 
play in the Pacific. 
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THE FIRST IMPERIAL AIR DEFENSE 
SCHEMES, 1918–1919
It will be appreciated that the complexity of the problem is increased 
by the fact that in the case of the Royal Air Force there is no pre-war 
experience to which reference can be made. 1
 — Lord William Douglas Weir
At the end of World War I, Britain’s leaders had to reconsider the 
traditional pillars of imperial foreign policy: a balance of power on the 
European continent, free and clear trade routes to imperial possessions 
and the Dominions, and superiority of the Royal Navy on the seas. 
Germany’s defeat, along with the revolution in Russia, created a power 
vacuum in Europe. Decimated by four years of war, the European pow-
ers could not fill this void, though some tried. The rising influence of 
the United States and imperial Japan tipped the balance of power away 
from Britain in the Pacific, although Britain may well have lost its 
influence before the war in its efforts to counter the growing threat of 
the Imperial German Fleet in European waters. 
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To add to the British circumstances, Britain’s global territorial 
responsibilities actually expanded in the war’s aftermath. By the end 
of 1918, a military expedition to assist the White Russians against the 
Bolsheviks, control of new Middle Eastern mandates, and the suppres-
sion of nationalist movements throughout the empire placed additional 
military burdens on Britain. Labor unrest, mutinies, and the Irish 
uprising further complicated Britain’s postwar military circumstances 
at home. Winston Churchill summed up the situation when he stated, 
“I cannot too strongly press on the Government the danger, the extreme 
danger, of His Majesty’s Army being spread all over the world, strong 
nowhere and weak everywhere.” 2 The huge national debt, created by the 
war, limited many military options that had been available in the past. 
Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard echoed Churchill’s warnings 
from the air force’s perspective: 
The necessity for economy remains unchanged, but the peaceful 
conditions hoped for have been far from realized. So great a 
portion of the world has been pervaded by the spirit of unrest, 
and so largely have the commitments of the Empire been 
increased by the results of the war . . .  3
The Dominions further compounded Britain’s foreign and military policy 
difficulties. During the war, the Dominions’ prime ministers demanded 
and were promised inclusion in policy decisions that potentially affected 
their respective states. At the same time, Australia and New Zealand 
pursued courses of action that ran counter to traditional British interests, 
such as claiming mandate responsibility over regional Pacific islands that 
were of no interest in London. This placed the British Empire in direct 
competition with Japan. While the Dominions demanded greater inde-
pendence with regard to their emerging foreign policies, they insisted 
that Great Britain remain committed to their defense. 
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With Germany defeated and Russia enmeshed in civil war, British 
leaders found a new threat to the empire: Britain’s Pacific ally, Japan. 
The Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance, signed in January 1902, allowed 
the Royal Navy to remain concentrated in European waters to counter 
the growth of the Imperial German Navy. In addition, the agreement 
helped to defend against any threat to British and Japanese interests in 
the Pacific from Russian expansion. During the war, the agreement 
proved its value when Japanese warships provided escorts to the troop-
ships filled with Australians and New Zealanders on their way to the 
Middle Eastern and Western fronts and even suffered some losses in 
the Mediterranean. However, in the postwar environment, could the 
agreement remain intact? Many thought not.
In assessing the postwar world, Trenchard remarked about the 
Japanese: 
It is not improbable after the storm in Europe, the centre of 
pressure of unrest will move eastwards and that the future will 
find it located in China and Japan. There would appear, there-
fore, to be grounds for an increase of our naval strength in the 
Pacific and pari passu for the building up of a suitable air force.
These considerations have already been weighted in 
Australia and New Zealand, and both dominions have inti-
mated their desire for air services. 4
Australian prime minister William “Billy” Hughes did not help Britain’s 
relationship with Japan. While making his way to Europe in June 1918, 
he made a speech in New York City in which he proposed a new vision 
for the future of Pacific security:
In order to ensure the existence of Australia as a common-
wealth of federal states of free people, the Australians must be 
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provided with a strong guarantee against invasion, and such a 
guarantee might be found in an Australian Monroe doctrine 
in the South Pacific.
To ensure the safety of Australian territory, it is important 
that control over the islands on the eastern and northern coasts 
of Australia should either be taken over by Australia herself, 
or entrusted to some brave and civilized State. It is the United 
States to which the Australians look for assistance in the matter. 5 
Hughes’s comments were as unpopular in Britain as they were in Japan. 
For the first time Australians looked to a power other than Britain for 
their security. Hughes imagined an American Pacific Monroe Doctrine 
backed up by American naval and military power or at the very least 
the creation of a “hands off the Australian Pacific” policy. This position 
staked out by Hughes in New York continued to be his steadfast posture 
at the Versailles Peace Conference. During the war, Australia and Japan 
expanded their spheres of influence in the Pacific. The Australians, 
who felt threatened by the German presence in New Guinea, took 
control of the island early in the war. In addition, a joint Australian and 
New Zealand force captured Samoa. Meanwhile, the Japanese, taking 
advantage of the German weakness, moved south and occupied the 
Marshall and Caroline island groups. 
These actions disrupted the peace discussions at Versailles in January 
1919. When Prime Minister Hughes arrived in Paris, he fully intended 
to maintain Australian sovereignty over New Guinea. He believed that 
all of the northern islands were essential for Australian security. Hughes’s 
claims to the islands and “Pacific Monroe Doctrine” directly clashed with 
President Wilson’s “ just peace” based on his Fourteen Points and posi-
tion that no nation should benefit from victory. Concerning Australian 
claims in the Pacific, Hughes’s reaction was recorded in the minutes of 
the Imperial War Cabinet meeting that took place on December 30, 
THE FIRST IMPERIAL AIR DEFENSE SCHEMES 15
1918. Hughes opposed Wilson’s position of independence for the for-
mer German colonies and argued that Wilson did not understand how 
essential these islands were for Australia’s own security. 6
In January 1919, the meetings at Versailles addressed the topic 
of Germany’s Pacific colonies. At a meeting of the Council of Ten, 
Hughes stated his uncompromising position:
Strategically the Pacific Islands encompass Australia like a 
fortress . . . this is a string of islands suitable for coaling and 
submarine bases, from which Australia could be attacked. If 
there were at the very door of Australia a potential or actual 
enemy, Australia could not feel safe. The islands are as neces-
sary to Australia as water to a city. If they were in the hands of 
a superior, there would be no peace for Australia. 7
Hughes’s concerns did not impress President Wilson who believed that 
the old notions of national security would not be applicable in the post-
war world and that Hughes’s position was “based on a fundamental lack 
of faith in the League of Nations.” 8 On this point, Hughes agreed with 
President Wilson, for Hughes placed little faith in the league’s ability to 
control “bad neighbors.” 9 Because of Wilson’s position, Hughes likely 
viewed the U.S. support in Pacific security as unreliable and returned 
to the position that Australian security was still best served within the 
British imperial system.
The stance taken by Hughes at Versailles placed British prime 
minister David Lloyd George in a difficult position between attempt-
ing to sustain imperial unity by supporting Australian territorial 
claims and at the same time maintaining a constructive relationship 
with Wilson. South African prime minister Ian Smuts proposed a 
compromise. Smuts designed the mandate system, which placed the 
former German colonies into three categories based on their social and 
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economic development and geographical location. The Smuts compro-
mise became Article 22 of the League of Nations Compact. Under a 
Class “C” mandate classification, the administration of New Guinea 
became Australia’s responsibility:
Owing to the sparseness of their population, their small size, or 
their remoteness from centers of civilisation, or their geograph-
ical continuity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other 
circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the 
Mandatory as an integral portion of its territory. 10 
The only power remaining in the Pacific that threatened peace, from 
the Dominions’ perspective, was Japan. Whereas Australia and New 
Zealand considered their own actions as defensive, they viewed Japanese 
annexation of the Marshall and Caroline Islands as aggressive expan-
sionism. New Zealand’s defense minister, Sir James Allen, believed 
that the British Empire would “regret” letting the Japanese remain in 
control of the two island groups. 11
In a cable, Monroe Furguson, governor general of Australia, also 
expressed concerns that Japanese expansionism was a threat to the 
newly formed League of Nations and the agreements made at Versailles. 
In Furguson’s opinion, the Japanese expansion into the central Pacific 
was challenging decisions made at Versailles because “she is a powerful 
nation having at her disposal great military resources [and] cannot be 
allowed to flout the solemn decision of the Conference.” 12 
With the emerging diplomatic tension between the British and 
Japanese empires exacerbated by Australia’s political leadership, Britain’s 
military began to evaluate how to defend the Pacific. Early in 1919, 
former First Sea Lord Admiral John Jellicoe left on an imperial cruise 
with instructions to determine the naval defense of the empire. At the 
same time, the leadership of the Royal Air Force began to examine 
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their service’s future role in peacetime defense of the empire. The pro-
cess of the transition to peacetime operations would be more difficult 
for the Royal Air Force compared to the army or navy. Created during 
the war by combining the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air 
Service, the RAF had no peacetime tradition such as providing security 
in some remote outpost of the empire or showing the flag during a dip-
lomatic cruise. The new service faced a hostile army and navy wanting 
to break apart the RAF and reclaim their respective air branches that 
were taken from them during the war. The air force’s leadership looked 
to the emerging antagonism with the Japanese as a basis to formulate 
its future responsibilities in defense of the empire.
The president of the Air Council, Lord Weir, asserted in December 
1918 that the Royal Air Force would take an important part in imperial 
defense. Weir argued that aviation had proved its value during the war 
but its future potential was unclear because the current state of aircraft 
development was still in its “infancy.” For Weir, air power in time would 
become an equal partner in imperial defense alongside the army and the 
navy, and “it will be necessary to provide an Air Force of such strength 
as will amply meet the needs of the Empire.” 13
Less than a month following the signing of the Armistice on 
November 11, 1918, Trenchard, newly appointed chief of the Air Staff, 
issued a memorandum outlining the RAF’s vision of postwar defense:
The Imperial aspects of the question [of air defense] cannot be 
overrated and must be considered equally with those pertain-
ing to purely national requirements; the foundations of the air 
power of the British Empire must be well and truly laid. 14
From the scale and scope of the memorandum, it appears that the 
Air Staff was clearly working on the imperial air defense issues well 
before the war’s end. Trenchard’s memorandum delineated how the 
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RAF would participate in and potentially come to dominate the defense 
responsibilities for the empire. The Air Staff examined how to utilize 
the air force in small and large conflicts while maintaining its indepen-
dence from the navy and army. It outlined specific force structures and 
dispositions throughout the empire and argued that the Dominions’ 
air services would need to play a direct and vital role in the future air 
defense of the empire.
The flying distances were truly daunting, especially for the limited 
capabilities of the aircraft of the day. Trenchard recognized that the 
state of aviation technology limited the effectiveness of air power and 
force projection, “owing to the comparatively short radius of action of 
contemporary aircraft.” 15 The Air Ministry plotted a route from London 
to Australia that required 59 stops — one every 200 miles — and cov-
ered the 11,500 miles to Darwin. Nevertheless, this did not deter 
Trenchard’s belief in the future potential of air power: “we possess a 
rapid and economical instrument by which to ensure peace and good 
government in our outer Empire.” 16
A vital element of the overall air defense of the empire from the 
perspective of the Royal Air Force was the participation of each of the 
Dominions in any scheme that would emerge in the postwar period. 
Trenchard wrote that both Pacific Dominions were interested in establish-
ing air forces as a part of their own security against a threat from Japan. 17 
The Air Ministry also felt that the Dominions’ air forces would 
need to have aircraft and training similar to the RAF. This would allow 
the two forces, even though separated by vast geographic distances, 
easily to mesh at any crisis spot.
Lord Weir in a memorandum to the War Cabinet emphasized the 
point that imperial defense would become ever more dependent upon 
Dominion participation, and he felt that in the future the airplane 
would be a critical element in that defense. Trenchard also believed that 
the RAF could not move forward in any imperial air defense scheme 
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until the Dominions made some decision about the size and form of 
their own air forces. 18 Trenchard’s position regarding Dominion par-
ticipation was different from the commanders of the Royal Navy. He 
looked upon the Dominions as full partners in aerial defense rather 
than providing adjunct forces:
The Dominions should be approached with a view to assistance 
in reconstituting the air staff into an Imperial Air Staff on the 
lines of the Imperial General Staff.
While it is not desired in any way to accentuate Eastern 
political complexities, the pressure of unrest in this sphere must 
be faced. In the past the fears of Australia resulted in the for-
mation of the nucleus of the Australian Navy, and Australia has 
already inaugurated her own Air Service which her distance 
from the Mother Country renders all important. 19
Trenchard envisioned an Imperial Air Force with all the imperial mem-
bers acting in unison. Such an agreement with the Dominions could 
extend the empire’s air defense capabilities while limiting the financial 
burden for Britain and the Royal Air Force. Trenchard argued that:
Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of unity and 
the necessity for organising these aerial resources on similar 
lines . . . both sides must make every effort to strengthen until 
a state of perfect and efficient cooperation exists between the 
various components of the British Empire.
The first essential is that methods of training and organ-
isation and types of machines and equipment should be 
standardised. Each Dominion would require a Central School 
at which flying, navigation, aerial gunnery and bomb drop-
ping, cooperation with land and sea forces, meteorology and 
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photography would be taught on similar lines. As types of 
machines improve replacements should be made on a propor-
tionate scale, and interchange of personnel should take place 
so that training and operation methods, improvements due to 
innovation, etc., may be co-ordinated throughout the whole of 
the Imperial Air Force. Thus, if necessity arises, reinforcements 
can be transferred from one quarter of the globe to another, and 
on arrival at their destination will fit automatically into their 
appointed places and carry out their appointed duties. 20 
The need for imperial unity was a consistent theme from the leaders 
within the Air Ministry. Once again, Frederick Sykes, assistant air 
minister, emphasized this point in a speech before a luncheon of the 
London Chamber of Commerce. Sykes believed that “air forces have 
become and will remain a leading consideration in questions of national 
and Imperial defence. The day is indeed not far distant when aircraft 
will rank equally . . . with other and older forms of war material.” 21
The Air Ministry wasted no time contacting the Australians 
about the extent of their participation in an Imperial Air Force. On 
January 14, 1919, Major Clive L. Baillieu, the Air Ministry’s Australian 
liaison officer, wrote to Australian Imperial Force Headquarters and 
requested that Australia provide information or plans regarding the 
air force strength relating to naval and army needs, personnel numbers 
and training methods, equipment needs, standardization of training 
and equipment, and commercial aviation plans in order to provide a 
reserve of pilots and mechanics. 22
The concept of imperial aviation unity was not new. The ori-
gins of Australian military aviation dated back to 1915 when the 
Commonwealth government formed the Australian Flying Corps to 
cooperate with imperial troops operating in the Middle East. By the end 
of the war, they had a force of more than 280 pilots and 3,000 support 
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personnel. In the postwar world, the Australian government saw the 
value of an aerial striking force and continued funding of an air force.
Australian leaders did not question the need to participate in the 
empire’s defense, but they did question the scale and scope of their 
participation and continually reassessed the degree of support they 
could provide. There was going to be an Australian Air Service as a 
component of imperial defense. The debates surrounding the role and 
formation of an Australian Air Force were similar to those of the Royal 
Air Force’s role taking place in Britain. 
Because the strategic need to attack an enemy’s industrial and 
communication capacity by air did not exist in the South Pacific, the 
Australian air power advocates were in a much weaker position relative 
to the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy. The air service 
would be required to act in a subordinate role to the other services. 
Their aircraft would operate tactically, providing air cover for ground 
or naval forces on the defensive and striking enemy shipping or ground 
troops on the offensive. 
Before the British asked the question regarding Australian involve-
ment in air defense, the Australians were considering their capability 
and the strength of their air arm. In a meeting of the Australian 
Council of Defence in early November 1918, the central discussion 
on the agenda was the future form of an Australian Air Service. The 
chief of the Australian General Staff, Major General John G. Legge, 
“thought that there would be less extravagance if Australia had a[n] [air] 
branch under the control of the Navy and Military.” 23 In the imme-
diate postwar period, the question of controlling Australia’s air forces 
remained the central debate in the Council of Defence:
The provision of a nucleus of an Air Force [needed] to meet 
certain fundamental needs of the Navy and the Army. This can 
be done for an annual expenditure of £1,100,000.
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The Air Force recommended is auxiliary to the Navy and 
the Army and is not an independent Force. It provides merely 
for the minimum needs of existing defence services. Bearing 
in mind the economic condition of the country and the fact 
that time is pressing, the Council considers that the provision 
of these minimum needs should be undertaken first but, con-
sistent with this provision, the development of aviation should 
proceed — for instance by the encouragement of commercial 
aviation.
In the opinion of the Council, this minimum expendi-
ture will give Australia a “sporting chance” of holding out 
till British command of the Pacific can be established. With 
any less expenditure there would be no chance to security to 
Australia in the event of War [with Japan]. 24
During these formative months following the war, the members of the 
Council of Defence agreed that it was important that Australia have 
significant air forces but they would not accept the creation of a separate 
air force for the Commonwealth. For Australia’s military leadership 
the principal defense of the Dominion was still dependent upon the 
army and the navy. Because there was no strategic justification for a 
separate air force, aircraft would have an important role to play but 
would remain subordinate or auxiliary to the ground and sea forces. In 
addition, Australia’s leadership was not confident that air power alone 
could “assure” the national defense. 25
Australia’s navy and army leaders decided to split the Dominion’s 
air assets between the two services and share training facilities. They 
felt that the army would ultimately require seven fighter squadrons, 
six reconnaissance squadrons, and two heavy bomber squadrons. The 
navy would need one torpedo squadron, one shipborne aircraft squad-
ron, and eleven flying boat squadrons. 26 These twenty-eight squadrons, 
THE FIRST IMPERIAL AIR DEFENSE SCHEMES 23
they predicted, would be the minimum requirement to give Australia a 
“sporting chance.” Ultimately, these squadrons were viewed only as air 
auxiliaries to the naval and military forces.
In the postwar economic environment, the proposed annual expen-
diture of £1,100,000 was an extravagant if not absurd amount for the 
Australians. Economic realities would soon force them to halve this 
amount of money for an air force. It was reported in April 1919 that
A scheme of aerial defence, which has been drafted by the 
Commonwealth Government, contemplates the establishment 
of various aviation schools with squadrons of Aeroplanes and 
seaplanes, together with an airship section, the personnel of the 
scheme numbering 1,400. There will be an initial expenditure 
of £500,000, and an annual expenditure of the same amount. 27 
Undeterred by the reduction of the military funding, the Council of 
Defence created a uniquely Australian solution to the problem. They 
envisioned the creation of a dual force consisting of a permanent air 
force and an aviation militia or the “Citizen Air Force.”
It is proposed to establish both permanent and Citizen Force 
Units. Permanent units will be required for Naval centres, for 
isolated squadrons, and for training squadrons. It is proposed 
that 2 Reconnoitering Squadrons, 1 Flying-boat Squadron, to 
be formed next year will be on the Citizen Force basis. The 
difficulty of a Citizen Force, in the future, will be the time 
required for continuous training for a pilot which takes about 
one year. 
Air Units will be organised as part of an Australian Air 
Corps. This Corps will be formed in two wings, one for the 
Navy and one for the Army. The Corps will be controlled 
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separately from the Navy or Army by the Minister of Defence. 
An Air Council composed of sailors and soldiers detailed from 
the Naval and Military Boards will advise upon principle; the 
administrative control of the Air Corps will be in the hands of 
an Air Board, subordinate to the Air Council, and composed 
of flying officers. 28 
The value of the Citizen Air Force would be continually examined 
throughout the interwar period. The formation of the Volunteer Reserve 
in Britain originated from this Australian idea.
Britain’s military leadership did not forget New Zealand. They rec-
ognized that this Dominion’s fate was closely linked to that of Australia. 
In 1919, Trenchard stated: 
The possibility of unrest in the East affects New Zealand 
equally with Australia. The length of her coast line makes 
her peculiarly vulnerable to attack and her distance from the 
Mother Country makes it necessary for her to be able to hold 
her own until the arrival of available reinforcements. 29
Early in 1919, New Zealand’s defense minister, Sir James Allen, 
requested that the Royal Air Force send an adviser to New Zealand 
to provide recommendations for the Dominion’s postwar air defense 
and aviation policy. The RAF sent Group Captain Arthur Vere 
Bettington to assess New Zealand’s state of affairs. Bettington issued 
a lengthy report to Allen in July that echoed many of the positions in 
Trenchard’s memoranda on “Air Power Requirements of Empire.” But 
like many of these early postwar planning documents, Bettington’s 
recommendations were not realistic and went far beyond the scale and 
scope that New Zealand’s political leaders or budgets were prepared 
to handle.
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With the war over in Europe, Bettington argued that international 
instability would continue because of the vacuum left in Europe by the 
defeat of the Central Powers. Bettington reiterated Trenchard’s position 
that Japan might threaten peace in the Pacific: 
It is impossible to reconcile the aspirations of all the nations. 
Signs of this are already visible with certain Eastern nations 
who have openly claimed equal rights. The Japanese may be 
persistent in its demands for equality . . . for this reason, also 
as a result of the elimination in the near future of the Central 
Figure 1.1. Lt. Col. Arthur Bettington (right) with New Zealand aviation 
pioneer Sir Henry Wigram (left) at the Sockburn Aerodrome, New Zealand in 
1919. Following World War I, Bettington toured Australia and New Zealand 
to determine the two Dominions’ aerial defense requirements. His subsequent 
report and recommendations laid the foundation of imperial interwar aerial 
defense strategy. (Photograph courtesy of Air Force Museum of New Zealand)
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European Empires as warlike groups, the centre of unrest in 
the world may now be assumed to have moved from Western 
Europe to the Pacific. 30 
Bettington warned that the potential antagonism between the British 
Empire and Japan would place New Zealand in the middle of any 
conflict between the two imperial powers. No longer could they enjoy 
the protection afforded by vast distance from the traditional sources of 
conflict in Europe:
While it is not desired to appear unduly pessimistic or to pose 
as a scaremonger, the Eastern political complexities and unrest 
should be squarely faced. The geographical position of this 
Dominion renders an efficient defence force a greater necessity 
than in the past. . . . The distance from the Mother Country 
is so great that considerable time must elapse before assistance 
could be expected from that quarter. The nearest point from 
which help might arrive is over 1200 miles away and even then 
it is by no means unlikely that Australia might find herself 
threatened at the same time and not in a position to give aid. 31
Bettington repeated the common theme among the air power advo-
cates that an air force would be an important third option for imperial 
defense alongside the Royal Navy and British Army. Bettington sum-
marized this point:
Highly trained Air Forces are now essential components of all 
efficient defensive and fighting forces, as aviation provides a new 
and distinct striking force of temendous [sic] potentiality. . . . 
A Nation thinking in three dimensions will lead and defeat a 
nation thinking in two, both in time of peace and war. 32 
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Bettington underscored Trenchard’s proposal that New Zealand 
should participate in the Imperial Air Force. In addition, there was 
an important connection between civil and military aviation if New 
Zealand were to participate in imperial affairs. Bettington also stressed 
that New Zealand’s air force should be prepared to render assistance to 
any part of the empire.
So that New Zealand’s aerial policy became a reality, Bettington 
strongly recommended that the Dominion should take immediate steps 
to build an air force compatible with that of the British and Australian 
air forces by standardizing their training, equipment, and procedures. 33
New Zealand’s meager industrial capacity made the Dominion 
dependent upon Britain for its aviation equipment and infrastructure. 
New Zealand would need to purchase all of this material from Britain to 
maintain compatibility with its imperial partners, Bettington reported:
It may be assumed that for some years to come at least, New 
Zealand will not be in a position to manufacture anything 
more than the actual aeroplane or seaplane and will have to rely 
on imported engines, guns, bombs, wireless sets, navigational 
and other aircraft instruments, etc. As the close co-ordination 
of aircraft equipment of the British Empire is of such vital 
importance, it is proposed that in the first instance the com-
plete machines and engines with all their component parts and 
armament be purchased in England, in consultation with the 
Air Ministry, due regard being given to the standardisation, 
as far as practicable, with the policy of Australia and the rest 
of the Empire. 34
In retrospect, Bettington’s proposal for New Zealand’s aerial force struc-
ture seems modest — seeking seven squadrons that included one fighter, 
one day and night bombing, one scout, one torpedo, and two flying boat 
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squadrons, two air bases, and one training depot. 35 Bettington argued 
that this force structure was the minimum required to defend the stra-
tegic points on New Zealand’s North and South Islands. 36* 
Reasonable as the proposals seemed, New Zealand’s leaders were not 
prepared to adopt Bettington’s scheme. Following a review of the plan by 
New Zealand’s cabinet, Minister of Defence Allen informed him that 
it was “impracticable” for the Dominion to spend the funds called for 
to implement the civil and military aviation scheme that he outlined. 37 
In response to Allen’s admission that New Zealand could not afford 
extensive aerial expenditures, Bettington sent him a number of sugges-
tions that further limited these defense burdens. He proposed to Allen 
a reduction in his recommendation by three or four squadrons, hoping 
that this proposition might address the fiscal concerns of the cabinet. 
Once again, he received a negative reply.
By the end of August 1919, Bettington counseled New Zealand’s 
cabinet that the Dominion still needed to participate in the imperial 
partnership. He asked that the cabinet consider appointing an air liai-
son officer to track developments in commercial and military aviation 
and establish or subsidize an aviation school on the North Island near 
Auckland and on the South Island near Christchurch. Finally, he recom-
mended that veteran New Zealanders with aviation training should be 
kept on a reserve list and trained annually on the latest developments. 38 
*Beddington considered the following as the “chief nerve” centers and the most
likely to be attacked:
a. Wellington and the Cook Strait
b. Auckland
c. Christchurch and Lyttelton
d. The northernmost part of New Zealand including Awanui
e. Invercargill and Awarua
f. The coal fields of Westport and Graymouth
g. Dunedin and Port Chalmers
To defend these strategic points, he proposed New Zealand establish first-class 
air bases at Wellington, Auckland, Christchurch, and Dunedin.
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For Bettington, these three steps were the minimum actions that New 
Zealand could take to maintain a credible aerial presence.
To this end, New Zealand’s government agreed. To create a reserve of 
aviators and aviation mechanics, the government devised a scheme to pro-
vide financial subsidies to the Sockburn and Kohimarama flying schools. 
During the war, both schools had provided preliminary training for New 
Zealanders who later served in the Royal Air Force. It became these two 
schools’ responsibility to train an active reserve of 200 pilots, to pro-
vide periodic flight training and lectures, and to train a cadre of aircraft 
mechanics. In the end, New Zealand’s government was only prepared to 
spend £25,000 annually on any form of aviation, civil or military. 39
Early in 1919, while the Australians and New Zealanders consid-
ered their own air defense plans, aerial strategists in London devised an 
idea that they hoped would address the fiscal concerns of the Dominions 
relating to the creation of their aerial defense and striking force and 
ensure that they would begin working toward the unified Imperial Air 
Force: British leaders initiated the transfer or gift of 100 surplus aircraft 
to each Dominion. The origin of the aircraft gift was Trenchard’s idea. 
Under-Secretary of State for Air Gen. John Edward Bernard Seely took 
the idea to the Imperial War Cabinet. For Seely, a gift of aircraft to the 
Dominions provided “an opportunity of giving assistance to Dominions 
which will be valued by them and which should be of great use in the 
general interest of the defence of the Empire by Air.” 40 
On May 29, 1919, the War Cabinet approved Seely’s proposal and 
decided to offer each Dominion government 100 surplus aircraft out of 
the thousands of serviceable aircraft left over at the end of the war. The 
War Cabinet decided that this gift would be available to any Dominion 
or colonial government that required aircraft and that as much publicity 
as possible should be generated on behalf of the government. 41 
On June 4, 1919, cables went out to the Dominions and Colonies 
informing their respective cabinets that the Air Ministry was proposing 
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to send each of them aircraft to become the core of their respective air 
forces. The gift of aircraft to the Dominions was well timed. Without 
monetary resources or established aircraft facilities and with limited 
military equipment at home, the transfer of aircraft would allow the 
Dominions to form the nucleus of their own air arms.
The Australians were most eager to obtain the aircraft offered 
by Britain. On June 21, 1919, Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Blamey sub-
mitted the initial request for four squadrons to “form the nucleus of 
the Australian Air Force.” 42 The British Air Staff recommended that 
this Australian force should consist of twenty-four Sopwith Snipes, 
twenty-four Bristol Fighters, eighteen de Havilland D.H. 9s, and ten 
Vickers Vimy bombers, one of the larger aircraft in the Royal Air 
Force’s inventory. For the Australians, the gift amounted to more than 
£624,000. 43 In addition, the British Air Staff made additional sugges-
tions regarding the importance of the Australians operating similar 
equipment as the British.
On July 9, 1919, in a letter from Lt. Col. H. Macquire, the RAF’s 
liaison officer to the Australian government, to Australian defense 
minister Sir George Pearce, Macquire made additional suggestions 
regarding equipment to be sent to Australia:
With reference to the proposed gift of 100 Aeroplanes by 
H.M. Government and the equipment of 4 Squadrons of the
Australian Air Force, I forward the following proposals.
That the following types and numbers of machines should 
be asked for:
35 AVROS. Training
30 S.E. 5 Viper engines in lieu of Snipes asked for.
35 D.H.9a, in lieu of Squadron D.H.9a with Rolls engines 
asked for. 44
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The Avro 504 would become the principal training aircraft for the 
infant Australian Air Service. The replacement of the Sopwith Snipe 
with the S.E.5a indicates Macquire’s preference for a safer and more 
stable aircraft. 
For Australia, the 100-airplane gift was only the beginning of its air 
force. Prime Minister Hughes envisioned the creation of an Australian 
aircraft-manufacturing sector whereby the 100 aircraft nucleus would 
be supplemented over time by more than 200 aircraft built exclusively 
in the Dominion. On July 4, 1919, Hughes wrote Prime Minister Lloyd 
George:
In reference to your request that I should outline my views as 
to the manufacture of AEROPLANES in Australia and its 
relation to the Air Defence of Australia: My view is that the 
best policy would be for the Commonwealth Government to 
Figure 1.2. Royal Aircraft Factory S.E.5a #A2-1 at Yanakie, Victoria. This 
aircraft was one of 35 S.E.5as given to the RAAF by the British government 
as part of the 1920 Imperial Gift. The RAAF’s leadership requested the S.E.5a 
over the Sopwith Snipe because the aircraft was more stable and easier to fly. 
(Photograph courtesy of the Australian War Memorial)
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arrange for some British firm of repute to commence man-
ufacture in Australia. To this end, I would recommend that 
arrangements should be with such a firm, and that we should 
stipulate for the right to take over the works on equitable terms 
at any time, and also to have the right of control of such works 
during war. 45
In an August 4, 1919, cable to Defence Minister Pearce, Hughes 
approved Australia’s acceptance of the aircraft gift from Britain 
along with his desire that construction of aircraft should take place in 
Australia. 46 However, few things are truly free; Australia had to cover 
the £25,000 to £30,000 freight expense to transport the aircraft to the 
Commonwealth. 47
The plan to supplement the aircraft gift with Australian-built 
aircraft illustrated Australia’s paramount desire to assert its indepen-
dence. The Committee of Defence established an Aircraft Construction 
Committee to guide the creation of an Australian aircraft industry. In 
its first report, the newly formed body recognized the importance and 
limitations for Australia in the sphere of manufacturing. The Australian 
government decided that they should produce dual-purpose aircraft 
such as the de Havilland D.H.4, capable of both bombing and aerial 
fighting. It was also important that the materials used to construct these 
aircraft should be from local sources. Though the committee making 
these recommendations agreed on the use of British equipment, a small 
fissure emerged. The Australian Air Board, established in 1920 to con-
trol and administer the air force according to the policies established 
by the Air Council, advised for the “adoption of American ‘Liberty’ 
engines in preference to a British type considering simplicity of man-
ufacture.” 48 This was the first time, but not the last, Australians went 
outside the imperial system for aircraft equipment. In 1938, a more 
serious rift would take place over the adoption of American equipment.
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The gift of 100 aircraft from the British government was not received 
in New Zealand with the same enthusiasm as it was in Australia. When 
the British submitted their offer to New Zealand, Colonel Bettington 
was writing his plan to develop military aviation in New Zealand. In 
a June 5, 1919, letter to Sir James Allen, Bettington urged that the 
Dominion accept the British government’s offer, “as keen competition 
for the available supplies was likely.” 49 
On August 27, 1919, Defence Minister Allen informed Bettington 
that New Zealand did not have the means to service a hundred machines 
and that the offer would have to be declined. 50 Allen’s rejection of the 
British offer was greeted with surprise and disbelief in Britain. Stanley 
Spooner, founder and editor of Flight, commented:
Sir J. Allen, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, says that 
the British offer of Aeroplanes is “undoubtedly valuable,” rep-
resenting about £500,000, but its acceptance depends upon 
the policy of New Zealand, which is not yet determined. The 
Wellington Post, commenting upon this statement, says that the 
offer of Aeroplanes should remind New Zealand equally of 
British generosity and of her own responsibilities. Admitted, 
in partnership with the Empire, to the League of Nations, the 
Dominions should rise to the full status of manhood and accept 
the gifts as a trust for the purposes for which they are offered 
and undertake the fundamental obligation of self-defence.
What does the Minister of Defence mean exactly when he 
says that the policy of New Zealand has not been determined 
and that upon this determination depends the acceptance or 
rejection of the Mother Country’s gift? Does he mean to con-
vey that it is possible New Zealand, which has borne such a 
gallant part in the War, will rest content under the shadow of 
the League of Nations and take no part in preparing to defend 
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herself or the Empire? It is impossible to say, but we do think 
some more adequate explanation is called for of why it should 
be necessary to publicly hint at the refusal of the free gift of air-
craft which ought to form an essential part of the Dominions’ 
contribution to Empire defence. As to the determination of 
policy, it again seems to us that it is really about time the con-
stituents of Empire had formulated their policy sufficiently to 
be able to say whether or not aerial defence is to form a part of 
the programme. 51
Bettington told the New Zealanders that he thought the government 
would be ill advised not to accept at least some of the aeroplanes offered, 
and that a certain number of these could be used in the periodical 
training given to his suggested Reserve force. 52 Facing pressure from 
the editorial writers and the British government, in September 1919, 
Allen accepted thirty-eight gift aircraft, twenty Avro 504 trainers, nine 
de Havilland D.H.9as, nine S.E.5a fighters, and six large flying patrol 
boats. 53 The British government accepted the New Zealanders’ request 
to limit the number of aircraft in the original offer. Owing to the delay 
in its acceptance, only a reduced number of machines arrived in New 
Zealand in 1921: twenty Avro 504s, nine D.H.9s, two D.H.4s, and 
two Bristol Fighters. 54
The early postwar plans and gift of aircraft to Australia and New 
Zealand had no realistic or immediate effect on the defense of the 
Dominions in 1919. There was no air threat. The vast distances that the 
British faced to move aircraft to the South Pacific were just as daunting 
to any potential enemy. Nevertheless, these plans and the gift served a 
useful purpose. Defense planners began to examine the use of air power 
to defend the eastern empire. The idea of a ready reserve or cadre of 
pilots and mechanics in the Dominions would later transform itself into 
the Empire Air Training Scheme, which trained tens of thousands of 
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pilots and aircrew for service in World War II. Moreover, the plans laid 
the foundation for an aviation industry. Finally, the schemes encouraged 
the importance of an “imperial” standard for pilot training, aerial tac-
tics, and equipment. The ideas outlined by the early planners remained 
constant themes in air defense throughout the interwar years.
